{"id":6,"date":"2026-11-09T06:36:05","date_gmt":"2026-11-09T06:36:05","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/philoscience.org\/index.php\/philoscience\/"},"modified":"2026-11-09T07:00:39","modified_gmt":"2026-11-09T07:00:39","slug":"philoscience","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/philoscience.org\/","title":{"rendered":"PHILOSCIENCE"},"content":{"rendered":"\n\t<\/p>\n\n\n
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Is Philosophy a
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tScience?<\/h3>\n
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Amid all this
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttalk about whether economics is a
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tscience, I began to wonder about
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tphilosophy. Not only do we have our
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\town
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tNobel Prize<\/a>, but most of us
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tspend our days testing hypotheses,
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tand even making (all too easily)
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfalsifiable predictions (e.g. about
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\twhat sort of intuitions rational
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tbeings will have under various
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcounterfactual circumstances). There
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tis furthermore a lot of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcircumstantial evidence that we’re
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tscientists. Many of us spend our
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttime hanging around semi-reputable
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfolks like linguists and
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpsychologists, and even
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttopics<\/a> that have no prima
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfacie<\/em> connections to anything
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\treputable, upon closer
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tinvestigation, are in fact linked in
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfairly obvious
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tways<\/a> to the most respected
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tdisciplines of all. Indeed, over the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcourse of my career, I’ve been
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tsurprised to see how the most
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tabstractly metaphysical topics
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\toriginally discussed by philosophers
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\thave come to impact a variety of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tclearly empirical disciplines
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\toutside philosophy. Work by
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tphilosophers on the metaphysics of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tmodality (or the semantics for modal
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tlanguages) resulted in a model that
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\thas useful applicability in a wide
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tvariety of topics (e.g. the study of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tprobability, the study of natural
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tlanguage meaning). Philosophers
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tnursed the notion of causation while
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tit was hiding from anti-metaphysical
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tforces, and now it is a respectable
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttopic again in the human sciences
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t(e.g. no discussion of practical
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\treasoning can ignore it).
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tPsychologists interested in concept
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tformation appeal to work in
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tmetaphysics as abstract as David
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tWiggins and Michael Ayers on sortal
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tconcepts (to the great chagrin of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tsome<\/a> of my colleagues). Some of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tus are even quite explicit about the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfact that we do
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\texperiments<\/a>. It is not just in
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tmy Quinean moments that I wonder how
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tto make a distinction between
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tphilosophy and ‘real’ science.<\/p>\n

\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t  
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t-Jason Stanley<\/p>\n

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Willard Van Orman Quine (1908\u20132000) worked in
\n\t\ttheoretical philosophy and in logic. (In practical philosophy\u2014ethics and
\n\t\tpolitical philosophy\u2014his contributions are negligible.) He is perhaps
\n\t\tbest known for his arguments against Logical Empiricism (in particular,
\n\t\tits use of the analytic-synthetic distinction). This argument, however,
\n\t\tshould be seen as part of a comprehensive world-view which makes no
\n\t\tsharp distinction between philosophy and empirical science, and thus
\n\t\trequires a wholesale reorientation of the subject.<\/p>\n

    
\n\t\t<\/span>-Willard van Orman Quine First published Fri Apr 9, 2010;
\n\t\tsubstantive revision Mon Dec 1, 2014<\/i><\/p>\n

     
\n\t\thttp:\/\/plato.stanford.edu\/entries\/quine\/<\/p>\n

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Further Reading<\/h2>\n
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